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RESEARCH & DEBATE
Was the battle of Midway won or lost? In a recent edition of the Naval War Col-
lege Review, James Levy grappled with some of the recurrent issues found in the 
scholarship of the battle of Midway, all of them related to the question whether 
one or another aspect of the Japanese way of war led to a catastrophic defeat at 
the hands of the U�S� Navy�1 Levy observes that an assumption common to many 
works is “that the Japanese did as much to lose the battle as the Americans did 
to win it, or more�”2 He takes issue with “cultural” explanations for the outcome 
of 4 June 1942, specifically the extent to which Japanese war strategy and naval 
doctrine were descendants of Oriental philosophy and the children of a culture 
that valued conformity and obedience over creativity and personal initiative� 
Levy rightly concludes that American “diligence” more than any other single fac-
tor contributed to the total destruction of the Japanese carrier fleet sent against 
Midway�3 
Levy devotes special attention to Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully’s book 
Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway, a work whose scholarly 
thoroughness he lauds yet one he simultaneously indicts for an obsession with 
debunking myths about Midway and with demonstrating that its outcome was to 
be found in Japanese practice and doctrine�4 In the 
process he gives rather short shrift to the degree 
to which their account of the early episodes of 
the war in the Pacific supports his own argument: 
that the U�S� Navy applied itself diligently and 
thoroughly to the requirements of carrier warfare 
in the Pacific, in such greater measure than its 
adversary that the resulting triumph reversed the 
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direction of the Pacific War within six months of its opening gambit at Pearl 
Harbor� In a careful reading of both engagements, the battle of Midway and the 
battle of the Coral Sea, one is struck by those specific qualities of the U�S� Navy 
that in the first six months of the Pacific War made it especially ripe for a major 
victory over the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN)� 
Admittedly, Parshall and Tully level many substantive criticisms against the es-
tablished scholarly myths about Midway and trace much of the IJN’s thought and 
action to systemic factors derived as much from a way of life as from the practical 
challenges of modern naval warfare� Yet in this they are in the good company of 
other works, such as Kaigun, by David Evans and Mark Peattie, that locate much 
of the spirit of Japanese early naval thought in the mystical bent of Akiyama 
Saneyuki, whose most baleful impact on the IJN of World War II was, ironically, 
a Mahanian faith in decisive battle that the U�S� Navy no longer shared�5 In Levy’s 
effort to make the case for American diligence in preparation for Midway, howev-
er, Levy himself fails to pay sufficient attention to a factor appropriately stressed 
by Parshall and Tully in the introduction and conclusion of their analysis, one 
that cannot be excluded from any responsible treatment of Midway—the learn-
ing culture developed in the white heat of conflict between the battle of the Coral 
Sea and the battle of Midway� The U�S� Navy’s greatest triumph was the product 
less of Japanese cultural pathologies than of the intellectual profit the Americans 
gained from the lesser engagement only a month before� For Parshall and Tully, 
Coral Sea was in many respects the overture to the opera, so much so that what 
happened at Midway is not wholly comprehensible without an understanding of 
the outcome of the earlier engagement, as well as of the American and Japanese 
reactions to it� Any study of Midway ought to acknowledge that the limited en-
counter of the first instance that exerted decision influence on the main event of 
the second is not unlike the relationship of the battle of Ligny to Waterloo�
All histories of Midway, of course, acknowledge up front the enormous con-
tribution of the code breakers at Pearl Harbor in giving the U�S� Navy actionable 
information on the movements of Japanese task forces in the Pacific, along with 
coherent calculations of the intentions behind them� In the early months of 1942 
the U�S� Navy had an emerging image of the overall operational situation in the 
central and western Pacific, and in the weeks leading up to Midway it was also 
able to sketch a plausible tactical picture of the coming clash with the IJN� As this 
knowledge evolved, changes to command structure were also made, the better 
to integrate intelligence with command� Whereas Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto 
sailed with the Japanese Combined Fleet to Midway, which is consistent with the 
custom of decentralized command common to all navies of the time, Admiral 
Chester Nimitz remained at Pearl Harbor to orchestrate the U�S� Navy’s response 
to the Midway attack� Eliot Cohen and John Gooch note in their study of failure 
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in war that “Nimitz’s behavior at Midway suggests that the U�S� Navy did not sim-
ply refuse to change its traditional attitudes to command, painful as that might 
prove�”6 Yamamoto’s preference for sticking with what he assumed to be the tried-
and-true meant that he had all the foggier notion of what awaited him at Midway�
What awaited him, however, had to a significant extent been determined by 
the outcome of the Coral Sea battle only a month earlier and by the determina-
tion of the U�S� Navy to make the most of both the material balance of forces 
following that battle, and the lessons learned in its prosecution� The battle of the 
Coral Sea, the first-ever clash of aircraft-carrier fleets, had been occasioned by 
Japan’s efforts in the first stage of the Pacific War to establish a chain of air bases 
across the southwest Pacific and to seize Port Moresby on the southern coast of 
New Guinea, to maintain access to the Coral Sea and any potential targets in 
northeast Australia� These plans were short-circuited by the U�S� Navy’s Task 
Force (TF) 17, commanded by Rear Admiral Jack Fletcher� On 7 and 8 May 1942, 
attacks by Fletcher’s aircraft mauled the Japanese invasion in its opening phase 
sufficiently to force the postponement of any follow-through on the larger plan� 
Thus although the Coral Sea fight was a marginal tactical victory for the IJN, in 
terms of ships and tonnage sunk, it amounted to a small strategic triumph for 
the U�S� Navy� 
However, the material knock-on effects of the Coral Sea conflict were highly 
significant� At the beginning of 1942 the IJN had a quantitative edge over the 
U�S� Navy’s carrier force� Japan had six fleet carriers—Akagi, Kaga, Hiryū, Sōryū, 
Shōkaku, and Zuikaku. In addition, the light carriers Hōshō, Ryujo, Shōhō, and 
Zuihō were available to support operations of the fleet carriers� The United 
States had five fleet carriers available for operations in the Pacific� The design 
and capabilities across all classes varied enormously; USS Lexington (CV 2) and 
USS Saratoga (CV 3) were converted cruisers dating to the 1920s, whereas USS 
Yorktown (CV 5), USS Enterprise (CV 6), and USS Hornet (CV 8) were the first 
genuinely modern fleet carriers� At Coral Sea, Japanese aircraft were able to sink 
Lexington and inflict serious damage to Yorktown. In return American aircraft 
destroyed Shōhō� 
Parshall and Tully, as well as Craig Symonds in his book on Midway, note that 
the overall material damage rendered at Coral Sea to the IJN’s fighting capacity 
went well beyond the ships sunk outright� Although Shōhō’s loss was hardly a 
body blow, the damage to the fleet carrier Shōkaku was sufficient to strike it from 
the roster for the Midway operation, and Zuikaku was withdrawn as well, owing 
entirely to aircraft losses� In this instance a factor intervened in the aftermath of 
Coral Sea that might be deemed “cultural” but that was, strictly speaking, organi-
zational in nature� Parshall and Tully point out that the IJN could have attempted 
to reconstitute Zuikaku’s air wing in time for Midway but that such a change 
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would have violated an organizational custom that married Japanese air units to 
specific carriers� If either a ship or its air wing were not in condition for opera-
tions, both were withdrawn� So Coral Sea took one light IJN carrier, Shōhō, out 
of action permanently, while two heavy carriers slated for the attack on Midway, 
Shōkaku and Zuikaku, would not be there�7 The IJN decided to take four, not six, 
carriers to its showdown at Midway� 
Furthermore, before Coral Sea the Japanese had a wide edge over the U�S� 
Navy in experienced pilots� At Coral Sea they lost many of their best pilots, while 
their comparatively green American adversaries gained valuable experience in 
the art of attacking Japanese carriers�8 What Fletcher’s force achieved at Coral 
Sea, therefore, amounted to much more than a short-term check to Japanese 
strategic plans; it seriously compromised the total strength the IJN could bring 
to bear against the American carriers at Midway� Paul Dull, in his battle history 
of the IJN, wonders whether these losses alone might have deprived Japan of the 
smashing victory at Midway�9 
Even if one sets aside such speculation, Coral Sea was at the very least an in-
stallment on a future defeat� If a cornerstone of Japanese strategic doctrine was 
to employ overwhelming force and advantage of numbers, Coral Sea sharply 
reduced that advantage; “if an objective wasn’t important enough to require 
sending all six carriers,” Parshall and Tully remind us, “it wasn’t worth going 
after at all,” so that “Japan paid the ultimate price for her violation a month later 
at Midway�”10
That the price at Midway turned out to be so high was the U�S� Navy’s achieve-
ment, both in making the most of the strategic opportunity that sound intelli-
gence afforded it and in drawing tactical lessons from Coral Sea to maximize the 
dividend offered by the opportunity at hand� The effect of the IJN’s decision to 
scratch off two carriers from the Midway operation following Coral Sea was com-
pounded by the U�S� Navy’s extraordinary efforts to ensure that Yorktown, badly 
damaged but able to escape destruction, would be repaired and refitted in time 
to rejoin the hostilities� Whereas under normal circumstances Yorktown would 
have required three months to refit, Admiral Nimitz gave the 1,400 fabricators, 
shipfitters, and welders at the dry-dock facility at Pearl Harbor less than three 
days of around-the-clock labor in which to patch and replace what they could� 
The effort drew so much electrical power that some districts of Honolulu suf-
fered outages� Symonds stresses that “whereas Yamamoto assumed that the loss 
of Shōkaku and Zuikaku only narrowed the Kido Butai’s [carrier force’s] margin 
of superiority, Nimitz knew that if the Americans were to have any chance against 
the oncoming juggernaut, they would need all three of their carriers�”11 By using 
the available intelligence to contrive an ambush of the Japanese force in Midway’s 
proximity, he improved the odds further� Along with Enterprise and Hornet, the 
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presence of Yorktown plus the use of the airstrip on Midway Island would give 
Nimitz four platforms from which to launch aircraft—parity with the Japanese 
force that at no other time and place in the opening months of the war in the 
Pacific had been possible� 
Meanwhile, the Japanese command assumed that Coral Sea had put both Lex-
ington and Yorktown out of action� Whether or not one indicts “victory disease” 
for the overconfidence in proceeding with the Midway operation, the casualness 
with which the IJN reduced by a third the forces it intended to employ stands in 
stark contrast to American effort to retrieve Yorktown from near death to fight-
ing fitness� It is important to underscore, moreover, that Yorktown’s presence 
at Midway was valuable far beyond the mathematical balance of carriers� Spe-
cifically, the experience of Yorktown’s aviators at Midway sharpened American 
air-strike capabilities significantly� John Lundstrom’s study of naval air combat 
in the Pacific notes that Coral Sea was the first acid test of American naval car-
rier doctrine� Although there was little time between the Coral Sea and Midway 
engagements to study and apply the lessons of the former for systematic applica-
tion to the latter, “the Yorktown aviators were the only ones in a position to profit 
from their hard-earned Coral Sea experiences, and their excellent performance 
at Midway demonstrated the value of those lessons�”12 At Coral Sea, American 
naval fighter pilots had been introduced to the storied A6M Zero fighter, and 
they had appreciated the remarkable maneuverability of the Japanese fighter 
while learning that their own F4F-3 Wildcats were its equal in speed and climb-
ing ability and its superior in firepower and protection�13 Although Yorktown’s air 
group was reorganized prior to Midway—both to facilitate an increase in overall 
fighter strength in time for Midway and to integrate the new F4F-4 folding-wing 
Wildcats into its numbers—leaders such as Lieutenant John S� (“Jimmy”) Thach 
listened to the accounts of Yorktown’s flyers of their Coral Sea experiences� A 
hastily innovated version of the “Thach Weave” beam-defense position debuted 
at Midway under the most challenging circumstances and was remarkably ef-
fective in meeting Japanese fighter attacks�14 So, not only was Yorktown available 
for action northwest of Midway Atoll on 4 June 1942, but the experience that its 
aviators acquired at Coral Sea was integrated into the Midway force through the 
American mix-and-match approach to carriers and air wings, an approach from 
which the IJN abstained�
There is no need to engage in discussions of cultural contrasts between 
American and Japanese naval traditions or to work over the latter for real or 
imagined strategic pathologies to acknowledge that the United States brought 
organizational flexibility to the engagement and extracted every ounce of innova-
tive energy in its determination to prevail� Levy’s stress on American diligence is 
wholly in harmony with Parshall and Tully’s observations that with the overnight 
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refitting of Yorktown the U�S� Navy was already benefiting from superior organi-
zational practices before the trial of strength at Midway�15 In addition, it mattered 
a great deal not only that the U�S� Navy was to have a third carrier for Midway 
but that Admiral Nimitz gave tactical command of the two task forces (TF 16, 
with Enterprise and Hornet, and TF 17, with Yorktown), joined for the ambush 
of the Japanese force closing on Midway, to Fletcher—together, a commander 
and ships with more experience in combat with Japanese carriers than any other 
combination available�
Owing to combat experience of Coral Sea battle and the efficient launch of 
torpedo planes, fighters, and dive-bombers of Yorktown’s air group, Fletcher’s 
team was the only force to arrive over its target almost exactly according to navi-
gational calculation to deliver a timely and coordinated attack� Torpedo bombers 
were launched first, followed by dive-bombers, and then, in turn, the fighters� 
The objective of this procedure, that the three groups would rendezvous before 
encountering the Japanese, involved a quantum of risk, but Yorktown had already 
rehearsed en route with considerable success at Coral Sea� Other American car-
rier aircraft formations at Midway flew in small groups and became separated, 
but Yorktown’s remained closely coordinated, “with each of the tactical elements 
remaining in sight of each other up until the time they initiated their attack�”16 
Because Yorktown’s dive-bombers, to their own amazement, came upon the Japa-
nese carrier Sōryū without the cover of any combat air patrol (CAP), their attack 
was devastating� Seventeen SBD Douglas Dauntless dive-bombers, under Lieu-
tenant Commander Maxwell Leslie, scored three hits on Sōryū with thousand-
pound bombs, destroying its flight deck and gutting its hangar below� 
In combination with the destruction of Akagi and Kaga by the dive-bombers 
of TF 16, the IJN lost three of its four carriers (and the battle of Midway) in 
scarcely more than five minutes of action�17 Because dive-bombers from Enter-
prise had initially been unable to locate the Japanese carriers and had arrived 
over them from the southwest almost at the same time as Leslie’s strike force ar-
rived from the east, the Japanese carriers were caught from two directions at the 
moment of maximum vulnerability, when their flight decks were covered with 
aircraft preparing for launch� Not only did the U�S� Navy air groups approach 
from separate axes at approximately the same time, but they came in at high and 
low altitudes, presenting the Japanese air defenses with a challenge beyond their 
capability� Although coincidence accounted for this (what Parshall and Tully call 
“a healthy dollop of bad luck”), the impression among the Japanese that the U�S� 
Navy had such accurate knowledge of their position that it could synchronize 
attacks from different directions must have been psychologically devastating�18 It 
was certainly materially catastrophic�
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Other factors, then, contributed directly or indirectly to the scale of the 
American triumph� Among them were the improvements made to the U�S� Navy’s 
combat air patrol, based in part on the failure of American fighters at Coral Sea 
to break up Japanese strike forces before they could close in on the American 
carriers� Fighter direction and CAP at Midway were more effective (Task Force 
16 escaped attack entirely) when the idea of a layered CAP, aircraft operating at 
different altitudes, was applied to carrier defense� Even after Midway, American 
CAP required further development, principally through multicarrier task forces 
with highly integrated CAPs, but the effort to learn and adapt from recent expe-
rience was very much in evidence among the American fighters on 4 June 1942� 
By contrast, the IJN’s CAP did not improve significantly between Coral Sea and 
Midway and did little to compensate for Yamamoto’s misty appreciation of his 
enemy’s dispositions around Midway� Admittedly, Japanese pilots had to operate 
without the early-warning capabilities of radar; still, as Parshall and Tully point 
out, relatively simple tactical improvements could have improved the defense of 
the IJN’s carriers�19 One cannot help but be struck by the fact that the IJN’s CAP 
in no way compensated at the tactical level for Japan’s inferior operational intelli-
gence, so that the ambush effect hoped for by the U�S� Navy’s command unfolded 
largely as planned�
The limitations of the damage-control practices on board Japanese carriers, 
meanwhile, ensured that once the American dive-bombers scored major hits, 
the chances of recovering operational effectiveness diminished quickly� We have 
here another instance of contrast with the learning culture of the U�S� Navy fol-
lowing Coral Sea� It was at Coral Sea that Oscar Myers, Yorktown’s Air Depart-
ment fuel officer, realized that among the factors that sealed the unhappy fate of 
Lexington was the presence of aviation fuel on its hangar deck� Because the U�S� 
Navy thereafter drained fuel systems after usage and filled the lines with CO2, 
Yorktown was spared the ravages of a runaway fire when it absorbed a major Japa-
nese dive-bomber assault� The patched-up Yorktown was actually more resilient 
under attack at Midway; the carrier that had contributed so much to the U�S� 
Navy’s heroic struggle in 1942 ultimately succumbed not to bombs but to tor-
pedoes� Fifteen aircraft from Yorktown’s bombing group were able to participate 
in the retaliatory strike from Enterprise that began the destruction of Hiryū, the 
fourth and last IJN carrier at Midway�20 Lastly, the extraordinary performance of 
the U�S� Navy’s torpedo bombers and dive-bombers must be noted—the former 
sacrificed in the battle’s opening phase to annihilating attacks from Japanese 
fighters while the latter delivered the fatal blows to the IJN’s carriers when there 
were comparatively fewer Japanese fighters to meet them� Indeed, Yorktown’s 
third bombing group was unruffled by fighters during or after its attack� After 
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initial misses, the American dive-bomber pilots settled into a rhythm of multiple 
hits with five-hundred-pound and thousand-pound bombs on such vital parts of 
the Japanese carriers that even appropriate damage control would have been hard 
pressed to save them�
Above all, it is Levy’s point about diligence (a point not missed, and indeed 
stressed, by Parshall and Tully) that needs to be underscored� A culture of learn-
ing, arising from experience rather than theory and shared in the weeks between 
Coral Sea and Midway at every level of the U�S� Navy’s carrier task forces, meant 
that ultimately victory was earned by the Americans rather than thrown away 
by the Japanese� Levy is right to conclude that military historians are too quick 
to apportion blame� An almost perverse fascination with failure often seems 
to mark qualification for the profession� I do not share his aversion to cultural 
explanations for behavior in battle any more than I share the attraction of oth-
ers to such explanations� Cultural factors are simply harder to measure and less 
satisfying as an explanation than is a careful reconstruction of what actually hap-
pened� I do share Levy’s enthusiasm for Eric Grove’s scholarship on the Philip-
pine Sea, and I recommend that his stress on technology and training be applied 
to Midway, along with emphasis on the extraordinary application of hard-won 
knowledge in evidence in the U�S� Navy in the early months of the Pacific War�21 
This knowledge was remarkably on duty at all levels: Chester Nimitz’s courage 
in acting on the intelligence in his possession, to toss the iron dice on a fight as 
big and potentially disastrous as Midway, was complemented by the decisions 
of Fletcher and Spruance (in a knife-edge balance of prudence with bravery) 
to launch air strikes before they had perfect knowledge of the enemy’s position 
and intentions� Their commitment to tactical conviction, however, was in turn 
redeemed by the tenacity, skill, and personal sacrifice of the U�S� Navy’s bombers, 
scout planes, and F4F pilots in delivering a staggering blow to Japanese carrier-
borne airpower� John Keegan points out that for Midway, American cryptanalysts 
provided a picture “as clear as the obscurities of war will ever allow” but that a 
little less intuition by the pilots engaged to act on it might have compromised that 
advantage�22 Happily, the recent experience of Coral Sea in aerial reconnaissance, 
tactics of aerial combat, and techniques of dive-bombing made that intuition 
especially acute� Whereas the years between 1909 and 1941 witnessed the rise of 
Japanese naval airpower, the spring of 1942 marked the beginning of its sudden 
and steep decline�23
Nothing in the actions of the U�S� Navy indicates that its personnel believed 
God was on their side at Midway and so all would simply be well; to the contrary, 
every fiber of arm, heart, and brain was applied to narrowing the advantage of 
a foe who had hitherto seemed invincible� If there was a “miracle” at work at 
Midway, then surely it was that the U�S� Navy, at every level, drew all the right 
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conclusions from one engagement for application to the next� Any familiarity 
with military history teaches us that this virtue is so rare as to tempt the conclu-
sion that, if not the Almighty, then surely Sweet Reason intervened wholly to the 
benefit of one side�
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